分享论文

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model (Campbell Leith and Simon Wren-Lewis 2013)

分享人

赵军柱

（创新发展学院中国经济与管理研究院）

主持人

王忏

（金融学院）

赵军柱

（创新发展学院中国经济与管理研究院）

论文摘要

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy, which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises.

时间

2023年03月26日（周日）

14:00-15:30

地点

学术会堂712

活动对象

创新发展学院本科生、研究生

人数规模

30人

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