1.主讲人
李东辉,深圳大学经济学院金融与财务学特聘教授
Donghui Li, who obtained PHD in Finance and worked at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia for 19 years between 1996 and 2015, is currently a Distinguished Professor of Accounting and Finance at College of Economics, Shenzhen University, China. His research focuses on corporate finance. His publications include the following papers in leading accounting and finance journals: Journal of Finance; Journal of International Business Studies, and Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. In addition, his publications appear in the following internationally renowned accounting and finance journals: Journal of Corporate Finance (five times); Journal of Banking and Finance (five times); Journal of Risk and Insurance (two times); Journal of International Money and Finance (two times); Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (two times), Journal of Empirical Finance, among many others. He serves as a referee for numerous journals, including Journal of Banking and Finance, and Journal of Risk and Insurance. He serves as a guest editor for the following academic journals: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, British Accounting Review, Accounting and Finance, and International Journal of Financial Studies.
2.时间
2023年6月12日,周一,14:00-15:30
3.地点
学院南路校区学术会堂603
4.讲座题目
Inventor CEOs and Inventor CEO-Chairpersons in China
5.摘要
We study the central role that top executives and the Chinese government play in domestic innovation and how the innovation experience of such executives is perceived by the firm and third parties. We compile a comprehensive sample of 1,590 unique Inventor CEOs and 255 unique Inventor CEO-Chairpersons for the period 2003 and 2017. We require that all Inventor executives have filed at least one patent under their name. Our empirical analysis yields three major findings: First, we observe that Inventor CEO and Inventor CEO-Chairperson firms are associated with better innovation output. More importantly, we find that patents are of higher quality when the firm is led by an Inventor CEO-Chairperson and that the higher quality is even more pronounced in government-controlled firms. Second, we find that firms award Inventor CEO-Chairpersons with a compensation premium. Finally, we find that Inventor CEO and Inventor CEO-Chairperson firms have a greater analyst coverage. Given the Chinese central government’s aggressive pro-innovation policies and its influence on firm outcomes, our study provides valuable insights into the complementary role of top executives and the Chinese government’s role in corporate innovation activities. Furthermore, we also provide insights on the value that firms and external parties such as analysts attach to top executives with innovation experience.