近日，我院尹训东副教授的博弈论理论论文”Linear Riley Equilibria in Quadratic Signaling Games“（二次型信号博弈中的线性Riley均衡解）在国际顶尖期刊Journal of Economic Theory （中财AAA类）在线发表。合作者为北京大学光华管理学院翁翕教授、加州理工大学人文和社科部吴凡博士。

1.论文摘要

We study signaling games with quadratic payoffs. As signaling games admit multiple separating equilibria, many equilibrium selection rules are proposed and a well-known solution is Riley equilibria. They are separating equilibria in which the sender achieves the highest equilibrium payoff for all types among all separating equilibria. We analyze the conditions for Riley equilibria to be linear, a common assumption in many applications. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of linear Riley equilibria. We apply the result to confirm the dominance of linear equilibria in some classic examples, and we show that, in some other examples, there exist previously unknown nonlinear Riley equilibria.

2.作者介绍

尹训东

本科毕业于山东大学经济学院，硕士毕业于北京大学国家发展研究院，博士毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院，现为中央财经大学创新发展学院中国公共财政与政策研究院长聘副教授。研究领域为激励理论、博弈论、产业组织等。论文发表于Journal of Economic Theory, The Manchester School, Economic Modelling, Journal of Economics, Singapore Economic Review , The Annals of Regional Science，Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 等国际知名SSCI期刊和《经济研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内权威学术期刊。

3.期刊介绍

Journal of Economic Theory

创刊于1969年，是理论经济学领域最受关注的国际顶尖期刊，也是国际经济学界公认的经济学九大核心刊物（core journals）之一，其主要刊登包括机制设计、信息经济学、博弈论、决策理论、匹配理论、金融、市场设计、政治经济学、宏观经济学、货币经济学等领域的原创性论文。

4.文章链接：

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105733