本期主题
An Introduction to Bayesian Persuasion
主讲人
姜渭（北京大学2021级博士生）
内容简介
We review the persuasion game in which the sender can establish a rule for information disclosure, and we explore the belief-based approach pioneered by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In any persuasion game, the convex hull of the sender's belief-based value graph can geometrically characterize the value of optimal persuasion. When the state space is a continuum, we can address cases where both the sender's and the receiver's value functions depend solely on the mean state using the Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2016). Furthermore, if the sender's value is represented by an S-shaped function of the mean state, upper censorship is deemed optimal (Kolotilin et al., 2022).
时间
3月11日18:00-20:00
地点
学术会堂712
点评老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
活动对象
创新发展学院学生
人数规模
30人
主办单位
创新发展学院
