1.研讨论文：Censorship as Optimal Persuasion (Theoretical Economics. Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk. 2022)
2.主讲人：姜渭（北京大学2021级博士生）
3.论文简介
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender’s utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender’s marginal utility is quasi-concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender’s utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.
4.点评老师：张志祥、尹训东、史博文
5.时间：3月18日18:00-20:00
6.线下地址：学术会堂712
7.活动对象：创新发展学院学生
8.人数规模：30人
9.主办单位：创新发展学院
