学术午餐会| 尹妮娜 ：The Effects of Demand-side Policies on the Implementation of Centralized Volume-based Procurement
尹妮娜，中央财经大学创新发展学院人力资本与劳动研究中心副教授。她的研究领域为健康经济学、实证产业组织、以及创新和知识产权经济学。她的研究重点是探索医药行业的监管和政策改革如何触发医药企业的战略性行为（包括定价、创新和广告等）以及由此对患者福利的影响。例如，对制药业的渐进性创新授予市场独占期的利弊；新发现的临床用药信息如何影响医生的处方行为；儿童用药独占期政策下企业研发行为的反应；两票制和带量采购等医改政策的市场影响。她的研究发表在Health Economics, American Journal of Health Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Economics Letters, Review of Industrial Organization, China Economic Review, and The Oxford Handbook of Venture Capital等。
分享主题：The Effects of Demand-side Policies on the Implementation of Centralized Volume-based Procurement
摘要：Since late 2018, China's centralized volume-based procurement (CVBP) strategy for pharmaceuticals has introduced a pivotal innovation: the promised volume to pharmaceutical firms as a percentage of projected demand. This promise serves as a powerful incentive for firms to reduce prices in exchange for increased market share. The success of CVBP crucially depends on fulfilling these promised volumes. Utilizing comprehensive nationwide data from hospital molecule-level procurement orders between 2019 and mid-2023, this study evaluates how well these volumes have been met and examines the subsequent effects on the market shares of procured drugs, the average prices, and total drug expenditures under CVBP. Our analysis also delves into the demand-side incentives, such as supportive payment and balance policies, that facilitate the effective implementation of CVBP. Results indicate a significant uptick in the usage and overall consumption of winning drugs, coupled with reductions in the use of non-winning drugs and average prices of all drugs, thereby curbing total drug expenditures. We found that supportive payment policies doubled their intended effectiveness, whereas balance policies achieved only a third of this impact, underscoring that financial incentives targeted at patients are more critical than those aimed at physicians for the successful execution of CVBP.
