研讨论文
《An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design》by Timan Borgers Chapter 2 & 3
主讲人
龚雅娴（中央财经大学经济学院副教授）
内容简介
In chapter 2, we begin by explaining three examples from the theory of screening. We use these examples to introduce some topics and techniques that are also important in mechanism design. By introducing these topics and techniques in the context of screening, we explain them in the simplest possible context. Chapter 3 describes three classic mechanism design problems. We shall use the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium to predict agents’ strategic behavior for any given mechanism. We juxtapose optimal Bayesian mechanisms and optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms to illustrate the adjustments that need to be made to a mechanism if the weaker condition of Bayesian incentive compatibility is replaced by the more restrictive condition of dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
点评老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
时间
3月4日 18:20-20:00
线下地址
学术会堂712
活动对象
创新发展学院学生
人数规模
30人
主办单位
创新发展学院
撰稿：龚雅娴
审稿：尹训东
编辑：沈嘉怡
审核：王颖
