研讨论文
Information Provision in Two-Sided Platforms: Optimizing for Supply(Management Science.Kostas Bimpikis,Yiangos Papanastasiou, Wenchang Zhang. 2023)
主讲人
龚雅娴(中央财经大学经济学院副教授)
内容简介
Although information design has recently received significant attention as a tool for shaping consumers’purchase behavior,little is known about it's use and implications in two-sided marketplaces,where both supply and demand consist of self-interested strategic agents.In this paper,we develop a model of a two-sided platform that facilitates transactions between vertically differentiated suppliers and consumers who differ in their quality preferences.We focus on illustrating the potential benefits of optimalinformation provision in managing the supply side ofthe marketplace,including the entry,exit,and pricing decisions of potential suppliers.We show that the revenue-optimal information provision policy often involves delaying the disclosure of information regarding the quality of the available suppliers.Whenthe outside options available to consumers are relatively unattractive,we find that information designcan help the platform achieve a more revenue efficient matching between supply and demand.On the other hand,when consumers have access to attractive outside options,we show that information design can accelerate the discovery of high-quality suppliers,leading to an increase in the platform's total transaction volume.Moreover,in cases where the platform benefits from commission subsidies to incentivize the entry of new suppliers,information design can be used to achieve the same goal while allowing the platform to earn higher commission revenue.Overall, our numerical experiments suggest that the impact of information design on platform revenue,as well as on consumer surplus, can be substantial.
时间
12月26日(15:00-17:00)
线下地址
学术会堂712
点评老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
活动对象
创新发展学院学生
人数规模
30人
主办单位
创新发展学院
撰稿:龚雅娴
审稿:尹训东
编辑:沈嘉怡
审核:王颖