研讨论文：
《 Formal and Real Authority in Organizations》by Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole ，The Journal of Political Economy 1997
主讲人：
王岑文（中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院研究生）
内容简介：
This seminal paper distinguishes between formal authority (the contractual right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions). The authors argue that real authority stems from information. A formally empowered but uninformed principal will rationally "rubber-stamp" a better-informed agent's proposal, thus ceding real authority. This creates a core trade-off: centralizing formal authority enhances control but stifles the agent's initiative to gather information. The optimal allocation of authority depends on factors like the agent's initiative, congruence of interests, and the principal's own expertise. The paper also explains how factors like overload and reputation can increase an agent's real authority even under a centralized structure.
点评老师：
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
时间：
7月15日 (18:20-20:00）
线下地址：
学术会堂712
活动对象：
创新发展学院学生
人数规模：
30人
主办单位：
创新发展学院
文字：王岑文
审稿：尹训东
排版：沈嘉怡
编辑：沈嘉怡
审核：王颖
