讲座标题

Information Disclosure to Bidders with Horizontally Differentiated Preferences

主讲人

李志赟，Durham University

主讲人介绍

李志赟博士现任英国杜伦大学经济系副教授，经济学博士项目副主任。他于2012年于牛津大学获经济学博士学位，曾任职于国际组织和高校研究机构。他的研究领域为应用微观理论、产业组织和发展经济学，研究成果发表于International Economic Review，Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Economic Behaviors and Organizations, Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Comparative Economics等杂志。为中文社科领域的高引作者，中文CNKI引用数超4000。

讲座内容简介

We study optimal information disclosure in auctions where bidders have horizontally differentiated preferences. By formulating the problem as a linear persuasion problem, we characterize the curvature properties of payoff functions using tools from total positivity (TP) theory. Under standard distributional assumptions, we show that the optimal disclosure policy involves full revelation of attributes in a central region and full pooling at each end of the Hotelling line. Furthermore, we identify a complementarity between the amount of information disclosed and the number of bidders. We demonstrate that full information disclosure maximizes both consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, we discuss broader applications of TP methods in other auction settings, such as procurement and position auctions.

讲座时间

2025年9月16日周二9：30-11：00

讲座地点

中央财经大学学院南路校区学术会堂606

主持人

尹训东创新发展学院副教授

主办

创新发展学院

撰稿：李志赟

审稿：汪雄剑、尹训东

编辑：沈嘉怡

审核：王颖