研讨论文
Discriminatory Information Disclosure
（American Economic Review. Hao Li and Xianwen Shi. 2017）
主讲人
任奕遥（清华大学五道口金融学院24级博士生）
内容简介
A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure—releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types—dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design.
点评老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
时间
6月17日 (18：20-20：00）
线下地址
学院南路校区学术会堂712
活动对象
创新发展学院学生
人数规模
30人
主办单位
创新发展学院
撰稿：任奕遥
审稿：尹训东
编辑：沈嘉怡
审核：王颖
