分享论文

Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union（Journal of International Economics，Andrea Ferrero，2009）

分享人

李昊（金融学院，硕士研究生）

时间

2025年6月22日（周日），下午14:00-18:00

地点

学术会堂712

主持人

王忏（金融学院），赵军柱（创新发展学院中国经济与管理研究院）

论文摘要

This paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes. A tractable linear-quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules. In the optimal equilibrium, monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule. Fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level. Simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules. Conversely, the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions.

活动对象

创新发展学院、金融学院学生

人数规模

30人

主办单位

创新发展学院中国经济与管理研究院、金融学院联合主办

撰稿：李昊

审稿：赵军柱

编辑：沈嘉怡

审核：王颖