研讨论文

Equivalence of Lindahl Prices and Core in a Collective Choice Problem

主讲人

朱峰（博士生，北京交通大学经济管理学院）

内容简介

We study the collective choice problem examined by Delacrétaz et al.(2025),a framework that encompasses the allocation of both public and private goods asspecial cases and in which Lindahl prices are shown to exist and be efficient. We model the problem as a cooperative game and establish an equivalence between Lindahl prices and the core:every Lindahl price vector supports a core allocation, and every core allocation admits at least one corresponding Lindahl price vector. Moreover,distinct Lindahl prices supporting the same core allocation assign identical prices to all efficient alternatives. This result resembles a classical core-equivalencetheorem but is derived without relying on replication or continuum-player settings. It further shows that, in collective choice problems, Lindahl prices are not only individually rational and socially efficient but also collectively rational. We also extend the single-fim setting in Delacrétaz et al.(2025) to a multi-fim setting and show that the equivalence between Lindahl prices and the core continues to hold. We further examine the connection between the VCG mechanism,prominent under incomplete infomation, and the core. We show that the core being a singleton is the necessary and sufficient condition for each of the following: (i) the VCG mechanism satisfies budget balance; and (ii) the VCG transfers lie in the core. This condition is shown to hold in shortage markets.

作者简介

朱峰，北京交通大学经济管理学院博士研究生，主要研究方向包括博弈论、网络经济学、数字经济。论文发表于Journal of Mathematical Economics（2篇）、《中国管理科学》、《运筹与管理》等国内外经济学领域权威期刊。

点评老师

张志祥 尹训东

时间

2026年1月6日(上午10：30-12：00）

线下地址

学术会堂712

活动对象

创新发展学院学生

人数规模

30人

主办单位

创新发展学院

撰稿：朱峰

审稿：尹训东

编辑：沈嘉怡

审核：林艺茹