研讨论文
Diffusing Coordination Risk (American Economic Review. Deepal Basak and Zhen Zhou. 2020)
主讲人
任奕遥
（清华大学五道口金融学院24级博士生）
内容简介
In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others' previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates.
点评老师
张志祥、尹训东、史博文
时间
11月14日 (13：30-15：30）
线下地址
学术会堂712
活动对象
创新发展学院学生
人数规模
30人
主办单位
创新发展学院
撰稿：任奕遥
审稿：尹训东
责编：沈嘉怡
审核：王颖
